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TURKEY: AT THE CROSSROADS OF 
SECULAR WEST AND TRADITIONAL EAST 
INTRODUCTION 
PADIDEH ALA’I*
Turkey has always been at the crossroads of the East and the West 
in terms of both geography and national identity. Today, as the world 
faces growing tensions between secular ideals and an assertion of 
Islamic identity, Turkey is even more important as the country 
struggles to reconcile the ideals of “secularism”1 with Islam. On one 
hand, the current Islamist government of Turkey is portrayed as an 
example of a “modern” and “moderate” Islam that should be 
welcomed by the West.2 On the other hand, many inside and outside 
of Turkey view the rise of Islamist support as a betrayal of Turkey’s 
secularist and modernist roots.3 Additionally, those who oppose 
 *  Professor of Law and Acting Director of the International Legal Studies 
Program (2009), Washington College of Law, American University. The author 
wishes to thank Dean Claudio Grossman for his financial support of the conference 
on Turkey in January 2008 at which the papers on Turkey published in this volume 
were presented.  
 1. The Turkish Constitution guarantees that the country remains secular, 
Article 2 states: “The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular and social state 
governed by the rule of law; bearing in mind the concepts of public peace, national 
solidarity and justice; respecting human rights; loyal to the nationalism of  
Atatürk . . . .” CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY art. 2. 
 2. See John O’Sullivan, Editorial, A Perfect Storm Threatens to Swamp 
Turkey, CHI. SUN-TIMES, May 8, 2007, at 29 (arguing that the Justice and 
Development Party (“AKP”) is “the equivalent of any socially conservative 
Christian Democrat Party in Western Europe” and a favorable alternative to the 
Turkish army). 
 3. See Editorial, How Islamist is Turkey? Flags, Veils & Shari’ah, THE 
ECONOMIST, July 17, 2008, available at http://www.economist.com/opinion/ 
display story.cfm?story_id=11745570 (discussing the suit brought by Turkey’s 
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Turkey’s accession to the European Union view the support for an 
Islamist government as further validation of the view that Turkey has 
been and always will be a nation of Muslims with stronger ties to the 
Islamic nations of the region than to Europe. As such, it is argued 
that Turkey and its proposed accession to the European Union is 
incompatible with and poses a threat to the European Christian 
identity.4
On January 9, 2008, the American University Washington College 
of Law (“WCL”) held a one day conference entitled: Turkey: At the 
Crossroads of Secular West and Traditional East (the Conference). 
This conference was an outgrowth of conversations I had with Dean 
Haluk Kabaalio lu of Yeditepe University Faculty of Law, the pre-
eminent Turkish expert on E.U. law and E.U.-Turkish relations, 
while in Turkey as part of the WCL-Turkey Summer Law Program.5 
The aim of the conference was three-fold: (1) address the legacy of 
Mustafa Kamal Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey; (2) discuss 
the question of Turkish accession to the European Union and more 
generally the evolving relationship of Turkey with Europe and the 
United States; and finally, (3) provide a forum for a discussion of the 
current tensions in Turkey between the ideal of secularism and 
assertions of Islamic identity. All three goals highlight Turkey’s 
unique status as a country caught between the secular west and the 
traditional east with the potential to serve as a bridge and/or a 
battleground between the two. 
Three articles published in this volume, written by Fernanda 
Nicola, Catherine Ross and Rachel Rebouché, generally address 
E.U.-Turkey relations. Also participating at the Conference were: 
Feroz Ahmad (Yeditepe University); Haluk Kabaalio lu (Yeditepe 
University); Gianmaria Ajani (Turin University); Mustafa Aksakal 
(American University, Department of History); Ambassador Clovis 
Maksoud (Center for Global South, American University); Bulent 
Aliriza (Director, Turkey Project, Center for Strategic and 
chief prosecutor seeking to disband the AKP for allegedly “seeking to establish an 
Islamic theocracy”). 
 4. Editorial, Saying No to Turkey, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2004, at 4 (opposing 
efforts by members of the Vatican to block Turkey’s accession to the European 
Union because “Europe is Christian, so Turkey doesn’t belong”). 
 5. The Summer Law Program in Turkey enables students to study a variety of 
topics and gain a better understanding of social and political developments in the 
Middle East. For more information, see http://www.wcl.american.edu/turkey/. 
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International Studies (CSIS)); Tülin Dalo lu (Washington Times 
Columnist); Düden Ye eno lu (Union of Chambers and Commodity 
Exchanges of Turkey); Soner Çagaptay (Washington Institute of 
Near Eastern Policy); Claudio Pinto (EU Commission Delegation, 
Trade Section, Political Counselor); and Ayse Kadayifici-Orellana 
(American University, School of International Service). 
At the Conference, historian Feroz Ahmad distinguished between 
“laicism”—concerning “state control over religion”—and 
“secularism”—about separation of church (or mosque) and state.6 
Ahmad stated that the founder of modern Turkey, Mustafa Kemal 
Ataturk, believed in laicism since Ataturk wanted to prevent the use 
of Islam to stifle progress by maintaining a patriarchal society. 
Kemalists were not against Islam and, to the contrary, maintained 
that they were restoring true Islam by taking it away from the hands 
of superstitious reactionary mullahs (clergy). According to Ahmad, a 
“lai” government transfers leadership from “the ignorant to the 
enlightened” and for Ataturk this meant transforming a patriarchal 
society into a modern one. Turkey today is not in danger of 
becoming another Iran because of its different history and religious 
tradition; however, Ahmad recognized there is a real danger that 
Turkey will see a resurgence of the patriarchy fought against by 
Ataturk.7
In reference to the compatibility of Islam with secular, liberal, 
democratic forms of government, Ahmad argues that such 
incompatibility is a result of Wahabi/Salafi ideas of Islam propagated 
by the Saudi government and arising from U.S. opposition to and 
fear of Arab nationalism.8 By 1957 the United States perceived Arab 
nationalism as the greatest threat to its interest in the region, rather 
 6. Webcast, Turkey: At the Crossroads of Secular West and Traditional East, 
American University, Washington College of Law (Jan. 9, 2008), 
http://www.wcl.american.edu/secle/video.cfm. 
 7. See id. for complete comments. See FEROZ AHMAD, THE MAKING OF 
MODERN TURKEY (1993), for more information on the modern Turkish state and 
choices facing its leaders. 
 8. Salafism is often practiced by those seeking a more "authentic" version of 
Islam and places emphasis on imitating the Prophet Muhammed and the manner in 
which Islam was practiced in the 7th Century. See Caryle Murphy, For 
Conservative Muslims, Goal of Isolation a Challenge, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 2006, 
at A1 (highlighting the efforts of Washington-area Salafis to isolate themselves 
from secular society). Wahhabiasm is a Saudi-specific version of Salafism, 
financed and encouraged by the government of Saudi Arabia. Id. 
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than communism, and that “Islam was to be the antidote to [Arab] 
nationalism.”9 According to Professor Ahmad, up until this time 
Arab nationalism was “essentially secular and had succeeded in 
reconciling Islam and nationalism.” It is Professor Ahmad’s view 
that during the 1960s and 1970s the Saudis used their money to 
transform the very character of Islam by financing Wahabi Islam 
around the world.10 The face of this political Islam, according to 
Professor Ahmad, was to call for social and economic change and it 
reached its peak when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in December 
1978 marking the “launching of an ‘international jihad’ through 
Pakistan.” According to Professor Ahmad, the Iranian revolution 
further threatened the Wahabi Islam promoted by the Saudi 
government and led to the current power struggle between the Saudi-
funded and Iranian-funded Islamic movements for influence in the 
Islamic world. It is Ahmad’s view that “an Islamic identity [is] 
consistent with secularism as understood in Western liberal 
democracies” and that the problem is one of “recent making” 
resulting from the “infection” of Islam by Wahabism.11
The three articles published in this volume all demonstrate the 
difficulties that Turkey will face should it continue to aspire to be a 
member of the European Union. Fernanda Nicola does a wonderful 
job recounting the story of Turkey’s long and difficult path towards 
E.U. membership, demonstrating the contradictory and conflicted 
treatment of Turkey by the European Union. Nicola argues that given 
all that Turkey has done in preparation for accession, the failure of 
the European Union to live up to its promises allows for the use of 
the doctrine of promissory estoppel.12 Specifically, Nicola discusses 
the case of Yeda  Tarim where the Turkish claimants argued that 
they suffered a number of financial losses with entry into force of the 
E.U.-Turkey Customs Union in 1996. Nicola argues that such 
damage was created because of the “macroeconomic imbalance” that
 9. Id.; see also NCS 5820/1: U.S. Policy Towards the Near East (Nov. 4, 
1958). 
 10. Written notes from historian Feroz Ahmad, Yeditepe University (on file 
with author). 
 11. Id. For a more detailed discussion of Turkey’s modern tensions between 
religion and secularity, see FEROZ AHMAD, TURKEY: THE QUEST FOR IDENTITY 
(2003). 
 12. Fernanda G. Nicola, Promises of Accession: Reassessing the Turkey-EU 
Trade Relationship, 24 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 741 (2009). 
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was created by the failure of the EU to provide the promised aid to 
Turkey. 
Nicola’s views on the accession process and the European failures 
to live up to its promises were also discussed by Dean Kabaalio lu at 
the Conference. Kabaalio lu argued that Turkey has done a great deal 
to comply with the requirements of the accession imposed on it by 
the European Union and that from Turkey’s perspective the end 
game had never been to only create a customs union with the 
European Union.13 Kabaalio lu warned against any form of “special 
relationship” status for Turkey, as suggested by French President 
Sarkozy, in lieu of full E.U. membership. He warned that such a 
“special relationship” resolution would be a mistake as it would not 
“fully anchor Turkey in the European Union.” 
Catherine Ross argues in her article that problems of Turkish 
integration into Europe will persist even if Turkey does accede to the 
EU. In her article, Ross looks at the experience of Turkish 
immigrants in Germany where they account for 2.4% of the 
population.14 Ross’s article shows that the educational system in 
Germany has disproportionately excluded Turkish youth born or 
living in Germany from access to university education and that the 
differential treatment accorded training in Islam (as opposed to 
Christians, humanists (non-religious), and Jews) in the public school 
curriculum is only making assimilation and upward mobility even 
more difficult. Ross concludes that “despite recent progress legal and 
cultural barriers continue to inhibit the assimilation of German Turks 
into mainstream German society.”15
Rachel Rebouché’s article looks at the treatment of Turkey’s ban 
on the wearing of headscarves which was upheld by the European 
Court of Human Rights in the case Şahin v. Turkey. In analyzing the 
court’s decision in that case, Rebouché demonstrates how both the 
proponents and the opponents of the headscarf ban have used the 
concept of substantive gender equality.16 Rebouché demonstrates the 
 13. Webcast, from the conference Turkey: At the Crossroads of Secular West 
and Traditional East, American University, Washington College of Law (Jan. 9, 
2008), http://www.wcl.american.edu/secle/video.cfm. 
 14. Catherine Ross, Perennial Outsiders: The Educational Experience of 
Turkish Youth in Germany, 24 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 685 (2009). 
 15. Id. at 687. 
 16. Rebouche distinguishes between substantive equality and classic or formal 
equality by stating that: “Substantive equality . . . is concerned that laws and 
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problems with applying substantive equality to the headscarf debate 
in Turkey given that the European court accepted one version of 
women’s experience to the negation of the another based on what 
Rebouché sees as ‘scant reasoning’. The article also does a masterful 
job of summarizing the history of the Women’s Movement in Turkey 
from the time of Ataturk to the present, including Turkey’s accession 
to the U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
Discrimination against Women and the ongoing battle on the issue of 
headscarves inside Turkey. Rebouché’s article shows how dominant 
visions of gender equality are being challenged in Turkey, when 
increasingly, urban and educated young women “choose” to wear the 
headscarf. This new phenomenon is particularly significant given 
that historically women have been viewed by the Kemalists as 
protectors of secularism and Kemalist reforms granted women rights 
“‘as a means to strike at the foundations of religious hegemony.’”17 
Ultimately, the articles in this volume and the remarks made at the 
Conference generally make us ask: What do all these recent changes 
both inside Turkey and internationally portend for Ataturk’s Turkey 
or for Turkey’s European aspirations?
customary practices do not diminish women’s access to societal goods or 
perpetuate discrimination.” Rachel Rebouche, The Substance of Substance 
Equality: Gender Equality and Turkey's Headscarf Debate, 24 AM. U. INT’L L. 
REV. 714 (2009). 
 17. Id. at 729 (quoting Pınar Ilkkaracan, Women for Women’s Human Rights, 
A Brief Overview of Women’s Movement(s) in Turkey (and the Influence of 
Political Discourses), at 5, Sept. 1997). 
